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Are Jurors unduly influenced by Extra-Evidential Factors and should they be replaced by Legal Decision Makers? 
In an age of 24-hour news and instant communication, it is virtually a matter of common sense that jurors will be exposed to extra-evidential factors from a variety of sources. The fact that Juries consist of lay-people representing a cross section of their community means that it is equally likely that individual, personal factors will also be present. Research on Juries, their deliberations and decisions, is quite extensive and largely supports the argument that extra-evidential factors influence juries’ decisions. Whether such influences are undue or problematic is a separate concern. 
In this article, we consider specific extra-evidential factors relating to the perception of witness credibility, and draw comparisons with the importance of evidence in jury decision making. We conclude with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the jury system compared with a system that employs professional Legal Decision Makers. 
Joe Barlow and Craig Barlow, September 3rd 2016. 
A juror’s perceptions of witness credibility may be influenced by certain characteristics of the witness such as age (Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009) (e.g. child vs. adult), social attractiveness of the witness or defendant (Visher, 1987) and, in the case of expert witnesses, the authority of the witness (Ward, 2004). Pozzulo and Dempsey examined the influence of age of witness, the witness’s relationship to the crime (bystander or victim), and the type of eyewitness decision on jurors’ perceptions of witness accuracy and credibility (Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009). Their review of available research concerning the age of witnesses and its impact upon juror perceptions and decisions showed mixed results: “age was found to be positively, negatively, and at times not at all related to perceptions of credibility or verdict” (Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009) leading them to the conclusion that the perceived credibility of a witness may be influenced by other factors than age alone. 
The witness’s relationship to the crime, has been found to be salient with regard to child sexual abuse cases. Victims aged under 12 years are generally perceived as being more credible than adolescent or adult victims but child witnesses to sexual abuse (as opposed to victims of it ) were perceived as less credible. In non-sexual cases there tends to be a bias against child witnesses (Ross, Lindsay, Jurden, & Keeney, 2003). Victim's and defendant's characteristics would appear to exert some influence upon the deliberations and decisions of jurors. Victims that have a “non-traditional” lifestyle, extra-marital sexual activity and drug use, resulted in fewer guilty verdicts in rape cases (Visher, 1987). The notion of “Contributory Fault of the Victim" (e.g. willingly getting into the defendant’s car or being intoxicated), was also found to be detrimental to prosecution cases. With regard to defendants, those that were more “socially attractive” were likely to be perceived more favourably by jurors. Such judgements were based upon occupation, marital status, criminal history, appearance, and personality traits. 
Though Visher found little evidence to suggest that demographic characteristics of jurors had an impact, it is possible that cognitive processes should be considered, i.e. how Jurors think and process information. Concerns have been raised with regard to Jurors’ ability to understand terms and concepts such as “reasonable doubt” and "intent". Research conducted in Australia found that over 50% of jurors understood legal terms and complex facts most of the time but less than 20% understood them thoroughly (Yule & Darwent, 2008). 
The most recent UK Study of Juries commissioned by the Ministry of Justice (M.o.J) found that views among jurors about their ability to understand judicial directions was inconsistent; e.g. 69% of Jurors at Blackfriars and 68% at Winchester felt that they were able to understand directions, whereas 51% of jurors at Nottingham considered the instructions to be difficult to understand. The actual comprehension of the judge’s legal directions reduced considerably with only a minority of 31% understanding the directions fully (Thomas, 2010). Visher (1987) found little evidence to suggest that characteristics of jurors influenced decision making in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, there have been questions raised with regard to the capacity lay-people may have to understand and process large amounts of detailed and complex information. Complex fraud cases are an example. In 1986, Lord Roskill’s committee concluded that many jurors were out of their depth in complex fraud cases and that trial by random jury was not a satisfactory way of achieving justice in long-running cases such as “The Jubilee Corruption Trial” (Staple & Chance). 
Complex evidence or contentious evidence my lead to the need for Expert Witnesses as in the trial of Angela Cannings. In such circumstances, the outcome or verdict may be said to depend on the extent to which juror is persuaded that an expert witness is somebody whose authority they can trust. At the Cannings trial, Professor Meadows’s provided the Jury with a narrative of what he believed had caused the death of Angela Cannings’s baby. This narrative resembled other narratives by Meadows that had been accepted by previous Courts (Ward, 2004). Arguably, this had led to Professor Meadows attaining a reputation and eminence in relation to cases of Munchausen Syndrome (now known as Fabricated or Induced Illness) by Proxy, and his support of the prosecution case made the possibility of murder plausible. In this case, it seems possible that the jury were persuaded by the man rather than the evidence. The quashing of Cannings’s conviction for murder revived a controversy about the competence of juries to evaluate expert evidence. 
Juries, therefore, would appear to be inconsistent, unpredictable, and influenced by attitudes and beliefs that are not informed by evidence, but bias them for or against victims and defendants. Their process appears to be irrational and unscientific. Yet this may also contribute to the inherent strength of the jury system. The research into Juries and juror decision making tends to focus upon whether juries are influenced by extra-evidential, extra-legal and irrelevant factors in reaching their verdicts. This may lead to the impact of extra-evidential factors being exaggerated unless the influence of evidential factors is given equal scrutiny (Visher, 1987). 
Visher supported the empirical studies of individual jurors’ behaviour that found demographic characteristics were statistically related to judgements regarding the defendant, but argued that these effects were largely outweighed by the effects of evidence and case characteristics. This study demonstrated that case characteristics had a substantial impact upon jurors’ judgements of guilt. Certain evidence types were highlighted as significantly influential: Physical evidence linking a defendant to a crime scene, a victim’s or witness’s testimony of force or violent coercion, especially if weapons were used. 
Visher’s study found that eyewitness accounts were also compelling for jurors and this is consistent with other research concerning eyewitness testimony. Of course, the reliability of eyewitness testimony has been challenged and examined extensively to improve methods of eliciting eyewitness evidence (Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brinacombe, 1998). In the UK, the Court of Appeal ruled in 'R v Turnbull' that judges should withdraw cases based upon poor quality identification evidence in the absence of other evidence that could support the accuracy of the identification (Jackson & Doran, 1997). However, Visher found that evidence provided by the defense in an attempt to discredit the victim or witness’s story, e.g. in relation to identifying the defendant, resulted in a significant advantage to the defense. 
The UK study for the M.o.J. also found that offence-type had an impact on a jury reaching a guilty verdict. Offences where the evidence against a defendant is strongest, result in the highest conviction rates but those that require a judgement of the defendant’s or complainant’s state of mind at the time of the offence have the lowest conviction rates (Thomas, 2010). This suggests that Juries try defendants upon the evidence presented in relation to points of law and an individual’s state of mind at the time of the event is hard to evidence. 
The view that Juror’s do not have the capacity to cope with lengthy cases with complex information also lacks support. 'R v Rayment and Others' is cited as an example of the type of case that Jurors cannot reasonably be expected to understand (Staple & Chance, accessed 6/03/2010). The real reason for the collapse of the case was its incredibly long duration and lack of progress. The jury were found to have had a good grasp of the evidence and had no problems understanding the evidence or essential elements of the trial (Wooler, 2006). 
American research regarding the cognitive processes of jurors has led to the identification of two models of juror decision-making: The 'Meter Model' and the 'Story Model'. Within the former, the juror reconsiders their initial decision about the defendant after each new piece of evidence is introduced. In so doing, the initial decision of guilt or innocence is continually adjusted (Jackson & Doran, 1997). The 'Story Model' is an epistemological explanation of how jurors think and make sense of the information. The lawyer presents a narrative, or story, to organise their evidence for the jury. Jurors too will construct stories from the evidence and test these against common sense generalisations (Jackson & Doran, 1997). Their decisions are then based upon the credibility or plausibility of the stories with which they are presented (Ward, 2004). 
So jurors can and do utilise evidence in forming their initial decisions concerning the defendant. These initial decisions may also be influenced by extra-evidential factors. These factors may then be moderated by the process of deliberation towards a verdict based upon consensus. The fact-finding process is not limited to the accumulation of evidence but the assessment of that evidence in relation to legal standards. Prosecution for an offence is dependent upon sufficient evidence to match specific “points to prove”, e.g. that the person accused of theft had the item in their possession, did not have authority to take the item, did not reasonably believe that they had authority and intended to permanently deprive the injured party of that item (i.e. had not “borrowed” it). Jurors often experience difficulty understanding legal terms such as “reasonable doubt” (Wheatcroft, 2008) and “intent” (Thomas, 2010). Legal Professionals do not share this difficulty and therefore do not fall into the trap of equating “beyond reasonable doubt” with certainty. Therefore, they are possibly better placed to make a decision in relation to legal standards. 
Should Juries Be Replaced? 
The argument for the abandonment of juries in favour of Legal Decision Makers assumes that the view of a professional is the correct one. Professional legal decision makers may be considered experts in law. Lay-people may be somewhat in awe of experts such as Professor Meadows or the flawed scientific evidence that led to the wrongful conviction of the Birmingham Six. Consequently, a trained legal mind, such as a judge, may be more aware of the potential difficulties of scientific and expert evidence (Jackson & Doran, 1997). Judges and other legal professionals have the advantage of being able to learn by experience, e.g. past unsafe convictions (Ward, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the argument for Legal Decision Makers based upon legal expertise may not be entirely credible. In comparing Jury trial with Diplock trials (bench only trials with no jury) in Northern Ireland, Jackson and Doran (1997) found that Judges had a distinct “cognitive advantage”: they had pre-trial papers and during the trial were able to intervene with questions directly to the witness, ask to see maps, transcripts of previous evidence, or request clarification from counsel on particular matters. These privileges are not afforded to the jury who are required to listen to the evidence and then be directed on the law. This makes it impossible to evaluate evidence in relation to legal requirements as they proceed (Jackson & Doran, 1997). 
This potential benefit of expertise also carries with it the risk of what has been referred to as “Case Hardening” (Jackson and Doran, 1997; Ward, 2004). To take a judge as an example of a legal decision maker, is to consider someone whose task is to apply cold logic in evaluating the merits of a case against the structure and demands of the law. This does not necessarily take into account fairness as an aspect of justice. Whilst a legal decision maker may have the benefit of experience there is the likelihood that their status as experts lead them to be biased by their confidence in their own knowledge and decisions. 
A jury has the ultimate right to find defendants guilty or innocent. In this respect, they are the manifestation of democracy at work and a check against officialdom. Unlike Judges or magistrates, a jury has the right to acquit a defendant where the dispassionate letter of the law demands a guilty verdict. An example is R-v-Ponting. Clive Ponting was a civil servant at the MoD who sent confidential documents on the sinking of the Argentine Ship General Belgrano during the Falklands conflict to Tam Dalyell. He was charged under the Official Secrets Act. Based upon a strict interpretation of the law he was guilty and the trial judge was minded to direct the jury accordingly. However, the jury acquitted him. Ponting believes that this was because the Jury perceived the prosecution as being politically driven and "unfair" (Ponting, 1987). Once decisions need to be made concerning guilt or innocence people adopt beliefs because to do so is necessary to take action. The consequences of that belief in a given context influence the sense in believing or doubting a proposition (Ward, 2004). Consequently Jurors may require a higher standard of evidence than experts if the consequences of accepting the proposition are serious, e.g. the loss of liberty. 
As experts, legal decision makers may be able to make decisions that are “of the Law” but are ill equipped to make decisions that represent the values, beliefs and needs of the community. A Jury represents the community from which it is drawn and, having heard the arguments of the case, also relies upon the values, morals and priorities of the community to decide whether an action should be punished. This is the notion of “Laymans Equity”, that a jury can reach a decision based upon simple fairness rather than the law. 
1. R-V-Rayment and Others - This lengthy case collapsed in 2005 after many months and cost over £60 million. 
2. Angela Cannings’s third baby died of unexplained causes. Professor Roy Meadows was called as an expert witness who indicated his belief that she had smothered her child (Fabricated or Induced Illness previously known as Munchausen’s syndrome by Proxy). Cannings was convicted of murder and had this conviction quashed on appeal. 
Jackson, J., & Doran, S. (1997) 'Judge and Jury: Towards a New Division of Labour in Criminal Trials.' The Modern Law Review, 60 (6), 759-778. 
Ponting, C. (1987) 'R-v-Ponting.' Journal of Law and Society, 14 (3), 366-372. 
Pozzulo, J. D., & Dempsey, J. L. (2009). 'Witness Factors and Their Influence on Jurors' Perceptions and Verdicts.' Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 36, 923-933. 
Ross, D. F., Lindsay, R. C., Jurden, F. H., & Keeney, J. M. (2003). 'Replications and Limitations of a Two-Factor Model of Child Witness Credibility.' Journal of Applied Psychology, 33 (2), 418-431. 
Staple, G., & Chance, C. (accessed 6/03/2010). 'Juries in Cases of Serious and Complex Fraud.' The Barrister Magazine (25). 
Thomas, C. (2010). 'Are Juries Fair?' Ministry of Justice. 
Visher, C. A. (1987). 'Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence.' (Springe, Ed.), Law and Human Behaviour, 11 (1), 1-17. 
Ward, T. (2004). 'Experts, Juries, and Witch-hunts: From Fitzjames Stephen to Angela Cannings.' Journal of Law and Society, 31 (3), 369-86. 
Wells, G. L., Small, M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R. S., Fulero, S. M., & Brinacombe, C. A. (1998). 'Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads.' Lae and Human Behaviour, 22 (6). 
Wheatcroft, J. (2008). 'Legal Decision Making 1.' In G. Davies, C. Hollin, & R. Bull (Eds.), Forensic Psychology. John Wiley & Sons. 
Wooler, S. (2006). 'Review of the Investigation and Criminal Proceedings Relating to the Jubilee Line Case.' HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate. 
Yule, I., & Darwent, P. (2008). 'Law.' Philip Allan Updates. 
Crime prevention and community safety policies and practices have been dominated by the logics of the ‘social’ and the ‘situational’. What is the value of either for reducing crime, promoting safety and enhancing social justice? By Craig Barlow, (Nov 2016) 
There's been a conspicuous rise in the prominence of Crime Prevention within political discourse and government policy since the 1980s and 1990s. The focus within these debates has been on identifying the most effective and successful techniques and strategies used in the prevention of crime. This has led to attention being paid primarily to 'what works' in relation to crime prevention policies and processes. 
Crime prevention and community safety are difficult to separate from each other as separate fields of study (Hughes, 2003). It would appear that if crime is prevented, communities become safer. Similarly, safe communities experience little crime; they are more resistant to crime and disorder. The terms 'crime prevention' and 'community safety' are often used interchangeably or change their meaning depending upon the nature and context of the user. This suggests that we may equally refer to "strategies of crime control", "crime and disorder reduction", "harm reduction", and "public safety" (Hughes, 2003) . 
Within this discourse the two distinct logics of situational and social measures have emerged for crime prevention and community safety. 
Communities may censure behaviour because it transgresses moral values of the community. Such behaviour may not be proscribed within legislation but is condemned within the context of a particular community as wrong or disorderly. Behaviour may not transgress moral values but contravenes tradition or culture, and ‘justice’ may then be administered by the community or society (e.g. vigilantism, so-called punishment beatings and honour killings). Finally, there is that behaviour that is rewarding to the individual but causes harm, distress, or loss to others, e.g. antisocial behaviour (Andrews & Bonta, 1998). 
No definition of crime or criminality is totally satisfactory. Consequently, we may have conditions under which crime is accepted, tolerated or colluded with because it meets the needs of the community. Similarly, notions of public safety may differ according to the needs and vales of communities. Against this background, the logics of situational crime prevention and social crime prevention measures have developed. The key tenets of each logic appear to be in opposition to each other. 'Situational Measures' aim to provide objective, solution-focused techniques and strategies, and frequently employ technology and empirical data to provide solutions with measurable outcomes. 'Social Measures' utilize etiological theories of crime to identify at-risk groups and foster cultural change through education, socialisation and developing public awareness (Hughes, 2006). Despite the clear and apparent differences between these two logics, there are circumstances under which they are mutually supportive when implemented together. 

Situational Crime Prevention: 

That which can be identified and defined can be managed or even prevented. When crime and disorder are constructed solely in terms of criminal and civil legislation, responsibility for its prevention is perceived as lying primarily or even solely with the Police and Criminal Justice System. These bodies then have the role of enforcement and sanctions. 
During the post-war period and throughout the 1970s, criminological debates regarding crime, disorder, and victimization adopted an etiological approach to understanding the historical and developmental processes of crime in which interventions focused on the offender and their behaviour through the use of deterrents in the form of punishment and/or treatment and rehabilitation. High rates of recidivism contributed to a pessimistic "nothing works" belief in relation to crime reduction. Since the 1980s, criminology has shifted it's focus from changing the individual (the offender) to identifying and changing the environments and context in which crime occurs (the situation) (Tilley, 2009). 
Situational measures utilize a range of strategies and techniques that can be used in a variety of contexts. Decisions about which techniques and technologies to use can be based upon actuarial data, such as crime data held by police forces and processed by crime analysts. Strategies, techniques and technologies can then be used to address 'crime hot spots' and potential victimization/repeat victimization. Advocates of situational crime prevention argue that this approach is apolitical and objective. The use of technology and pragmatic strategies are clear and tangible, and therefore measurable. This logic discounts the need to search for the causes of crime in favour of controlling or reducing opportunities for crime and disorder to occur. Crime is a physical act born out of the “routine activities and structuring of everyday life” (Hughes, 2006). Crime is inevitable, and thus the causes are irrelevant. The primary emphasis is placed upon the immediate features of the environments or situation in which a criminal act might be committed. This presupposes that criminal behaviour is a product of rational choice: the decision whether or not to commit an offense lies with the offender. The offender will make judgments regarding the potential benefits of committing the offense against the potential costs, e.g. do the potential gains warrant the degree of effort required and risk of detection, and, do the potential costs of arrest and punishment outweigh the potential gains from a high risk enterprise? If the costs outweigh the benefits, they will be deterred from committing the offense. 
Situational crime reduction calculates risk factors (those that are known to increase the likelihood of a type of crime), identify the most likely crime scenarios, e.g. an insecure domestic property is most likely to be burgled in the early afternoon when the residents are at work and the burglar is less likely to be witnessed, and then take practical measures to “head off” the criminal by closing the opportunity to offend. 
The current approach to traffic offences illustrates this concept well. Hard data is easily available to inform the actuarial assessments of risk of road traffic incidents and injury to pedestrians. Accident black spots, where speed has been a factor, may be identified. Vulnerability in terms of injury to pedestrians might be similarly identified, for example, schools and residential estates. Accidents could be reduced and death or injury rates cuts by "designing out" the problem; for example, by introducing traffic calming, street furniture, and matrix signs that prompt or cause drivers to slow down. The controversial introduction of safety cameras allowed speed limits to be enforced through prosecution and sanction. These measures work in three ways: they reduce the opportunity to offend (it's traffic calming measures), increase the likelihood of getting caught (the technology of speed cameras with high levels of accuracy and reliability), and meaningful and direct costs as a result being caught (fines and driving license endorsements or license revocation). Of course many people prosecuted for speeding do not consider themselves to be a part of the criminal class. In other areas of their lives, they may well be completely law abiding. Consequently, the threat of prosecution may present an effective deterrent to offending and having been caught once, a driver may be less likely to re-offend, at least in the short term. 
More committed offenders, such as those who commit property crime will take greater measures to reduce the likelihood of being caught whilst also being more sensitive to opportunities to offend. As a result, Situational Measures in this context must focus upon target hardening (increasing the difficulty or level of effort required on the part of the offender and reducing opportunities for criminal enterprise through increased security, surveillance, improved design, and general deterrence). 
Situational Measures have their weaknesses and limitations. An intervention that may work in one area may not be successful in another. The famous Kirkholt Anti-Burglary Project gave limited information on the socio-economic context in which the project was situated . The social relations on the estates, the economy, the history of organizational relationships within the area, and the potential positive impact of the local authority’s environmental improvements program on the estates were discounted by the researchers. The search for tangible and causal relationships between interventions and outcomes often causes researchers to be too hasty to exclude that which is not immediately tangible and quantifiable (Crawford, 1998). Situational Measures are not apolitical. Governments place extensive political capital in the introduction of crime reduction measures and the pressure for success stories from political leaders, funding bodies, and the public at large are substantial. This may lead to a rejection of research findings or preventive initiatives that are perceived as having a negative outcomes (i.e. the strategy won’t/doesn’t work). This reaction fails to acknowledge the validity and importance of negative or "no effect" results from rigorous research that might offer valuable insights for crime prevention theory and practice (Crawford, 1998).  
Measures that work in one context may not be transferable to another. Similarly, there have been areas that situational approaches have conspicuously failed to address such as domestic abuse, child abuse and neglect, racially motivated crimes, and corporate and environmental crimes. Technical and technological measures are not available to address many of these areas. Domestic abuse, for example, has been a hidden crime that happens in private. A further complication is that the term 'domestic abuse' is very nonspecific and covers a broad range of behaviour with an ill-defined victim group. These difficulties become even more complicated within the context of child abuse, human trafficking, and modern slavery. 
The motivation, or criminogenic needs of perpetrators, vary tremendously. Child abuse is defined in terms of four categories: Physical, Emotional, Sexual, And Neglect (Department for Children Schools and Families, 2010). Neglect of the child resulting in significant harm may result from wilful and malicious intent and is defined in criminal legislation (The Children And Young Persons Act, 1933) or may be a symptom of parental deficits such as cognitive impairments, mental or physical ill health, poor inter-personal and problem solving skills, lack of support, and isolation. The private or hidden nature of these problems significantly curtails the opportunities for target hardening such as surveillance and monitoring It does not address the factors that make an individual vulnerable to recidivism or the social factors that give rise to crime and victimization such as poverty, unemployment and poor housing. Many of the Target Hardening Strategies that reduce the likelihood of property crimes are more available to the wealthy than the poor. Thus wealthier communities may be more resistance to crime than poorer communities. 
Situational Measures, therefore, fit well with the crime prevention discourse (higher visibility of police and Community Support Officers, city-centre CCTV Cameras, and better architectural design). At the same time, they may be said to be based on and feed into fear of crime and exaggerate public perception of the prevalence of crime. By contrast, Social Measures emphasise the need to strengthen communities and make them better able to resist crime and disorder through the primary measures of education and socialisation. These measures promote positive "pro-social" behaviour and responsibility through public awareness campaigns, advertising, and programs such as neighbourhood watch. As Hope (2002) explains, the success of the Kirkholt Anti-Burglary Project was not only attributable to the Situational Measures alone, but rather the use of the measures in conjunction with a range of Social Measures that happened to occur at the same time. 
The Social Model takes accounts of history and social contexts and seeks to identify an aetiology of crime. In doing so, it targets those at risk of offending, e.g. disaffected youth. When New Labour declared itself “Tough on the Causes of Crime”, Jack Straw identified these causes including parenting, truancy, substance-abuse, lack of facilities for young people, unemployment, low income, recession, homelessness, and the treatment of the mentally ill (Straw). The need to address these social conditions formed a significant part of the new Labour rhetoric "Tough On Crime Tough On The Courses Of Crime". Social Measures that were implemented during the period of the New Labour government are reflected in the introduction of Antisocial Behaviour Orders, restorative justice and diversion programmes designed to target new and young offenders early in their criminal career with a view to breaking cycles of offending behaviour. Social Measures have operated more effectively in relation to situational crime prevention’s missed targets.  
The Duluth Model of Domestic Violence Intervention promotes a multi-agency approach to intervening in domestic abuse. Multi-disciplinary working and utilisation of community resources have underpinned child safeguarding since 1989, and more recently Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels have been established to safeguard communities from violent and mentally disordered offenders upon discharge from custody. Central to these programmes are the principles of information sharing and an ecology of knowledge and expertise. 
The reduction of recidivism among sex offenders has been significantly enhanced by the implementation of the Circles of Support and Accountability programme. It is based on the acknowledgement of the fact that upon release from custody, convicted child sex offenders are isolated emotionally and socially, putting them at risk of reoffending. The 'Circles' consist of a small number of critical friends who, with training, guidance and liaison with professional agencies, support, educate and advise the ex-offender with a view to reducing the likelihood of re-offending. This utilises the support of non-professional support systems of volunteers (Wilson, Picheca, & Prinzo, 2005). 
Restorative Justice programmes seek to educate offenders but also support victims in being heard, to ensure that the impact of the crime is understood. The Criminal Justice System has little concern for the victim in making judgements about whether or not a crime has occurred and many victims feel excluded from the process. Restorative justice actively seeks input from victims of crime. In the context of crimes such as domestic violence, the primary concern of the victims is that the violence should stop, there is less concern regarding arrest and punishment. Social Measures are slow to yield results and require significant institutional reorganisation to implement and measurement of the results is problematic. However, when combined with Situational Measures, even in the murky context of child protection and domestic violence, practical interventions can support cultural and social change. How else would drink driving have become socially so unacceptable? 


(1933) Children And Young Persons Act. HMSO. 
(2008) 'What is the Duluth Model?' Retrieved 12 05, 2010, from 
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Crawford, A. (1998). 'Evaluating Crime Prevention and Community Safety.' In A. Crawford, 'Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practice.' New York: Longman. 
Department for Children Schools and Families. (2010). 'Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.' HM Government. 
Hope, T. (2002). 'The Road Taken.' In G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin, & j. Muncie (Eds.), 'Crime Prevention and Community Safety; New Directions' (pp. 37-57). Open University / SAGE. 
Hughes, G. (2003). 'A Brief History of Community Safety: A Critical Reflection From the Academy.' Community Safety Journal, 2 (4), 22-28. 
Hughes, G. (2006). 1.2 'The Logic of Primary Situational Crime Prevention.' In D863 'Community Safety, Crime Prevention and Social Control - Study Guide.' Open University. 
Straw, J. (n.d.). 'Text of Speech by Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw, Speech to the NACRO A.G.M.' Retrieved December 04, 2010, from 
Tilley, N. (2009). 'Crime Prevention in Britain 1975-2010.' In G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin, & J. Muncie (Eds.), 'Crime Prevention and Community Safety' (p. 13). Open Uiversity / SAGE. 
Wilson, R. J., Picheca, J. E., & Prinzo, M. (2005). 'Circles of Support and Accountability: An Evaluation of the Pilot Project in South Central Ontario'. Correctional Service of Canada. 

Kevin Bales TED Talk. 

Kevin Bales is is one of the world’s foremost experts on modern slavery: an author, a professor of sociology, and consultant to the United Nations Global Program on Human Trafficking. In this TED Talk, he explains the business of modern slavery. He shares facts and figures and personal experiences from his research in the field. 
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